🔗 Share this article

Marking two years after that mass murder of the events of October 7th, an event that deeply affected world Jewry more than any event since the establishment of the state of Israel.

Within Jewish communities the event proved deeply traumatic. For the state of Israel, the situation represented deeply humiliating. The entire Zionist project had been established on the presumption which held that the Jewish state would prevent things like this from ever happening again.

A response appeared unavoidable. However, the particular response undertaken by Israel – the widespread destruction of the Gaza Strip, the casualties of many thousands ordinary people – constituted a specific policy. This particular approach complicated how many US Jewish community members processed the initial assault that precipitated the response, and currently challenges their commemoration of that date. In what way can people grieve and remember a tragedy affecting their nation during devastation done to a different population attributed to their identity?

The Challenge of Grieving

The complexity in grieving lies in the circumstance where no agreement exists about what any of this means. In fact, within US Jewish circles, the recent twenty-four months have witnessed the collapse of a fifty-year unity on Zionism itself.

The early development of a Zionist consensus within US Jewish communities extends as far back as writings from 1915 written by a legal scholar and then future Supreme Court judge Justice Brandeis titled “Jewish Issues; How to Solve it”. But the consensus really takes hold subsequent to the six-day war that year. Earlier, Jewish Americans contained a delicate yet functioning cohabitation among different factions that had diverse perspectives concerning the need of a Jewish state – Zionists, non-Zionists and opponents.

Historical Context

That coexistence persisted through the 1950s and 60s, through surviving aspects of leftist Jewish organizations, in the non-Zionist Jewish communal organization, within the critical Jewish organization and similar institutions. For Louis Finkelstein, the head of the Jewish Theological Seminary, the Zionist movement had greater religious significance instead of governmental, and he prohibited performance of Hatikvah, the Israeli national anthem, at JTS ordinations in those years. Nor were Zionist ideology the main element within modern Orthodox Judaism before that war. Jewish identitarian alternatives coexisted.

But after Israel overcame neighboring countries during the 1967 conflict that year, occupying territories comprising the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Jerusalem's eastern sector, US Jewish relationship to the nation underwent significant transformation. Israel’s victory, combined with longstanding fears about another genocide, led to a growing belief in the country’s essential significance for Jewish communities, and a source of pride regarding its endurance. Language about the extraordinary aspect of the victory and the “liberation” of areas assigned the movement a theological, potentially salvific, meaning. In that triumphant era, much of the remaining ambivalence toward Israel dissipated. In the early 1970s, Publication editor the commentator famously proclaimed: “Zionism unites us all.”

The Agreement and Its Boundaries

The pro-Israel agreement excluded Haredi Jews – who typically thought a nation should only be established via conventional understanding of the messiah – however joined Reform Judaism, Conservative Judaism, contemporary Orthodox and most unaffiliated individuals. The predominant version of the unified position, what became known as liberal Zionism, was based on the conviction about the nation as a progressive and liberal – though Jewish-centered – country. Numerous US Jews saw the occupation of local, Syrian and Egyptian lands after 1967 as provisional, assuming that a solution was forthcoming that would ensure Jewish demographic dominance in pre-1967 Israel and neighbor recognition of the nation.

Multiple generations of Jewish Americans grew up with pro-Israel ideology a core part of their religious identity. The state transformed into a key component of Jewish education. Yom Ha'atzmaut evolved into a religious observance. Blue and white banners adorned religious institutions. Youth programs became infused with Israeli songs and education of contemporary Hebrew, with Israelis visiting educating American teenagers national traditions. Trips to the nation grew and reached new heights through Birthright programs during that year, offering complimentary travel to Israel became available to young American Jews. The state affected nearly every aspect of US Jewish life.

Changing Dynamics

Ironically, during this period after 1967, Jewish Americans grew skilled regarding denominational coexistence. Acceptance and discussion across various Jewish groups grew.

Yet concerning Zionism and Israel – that represented diversity reached its limit. Individuals might align with a rightwing Zionist or a liberal advocate, however endorsement of the nation as a Jewish homeland was a given, and questioning that narrative positioned you beyond accepted boundaries – outside the community, as one publication described it in a piece that year.

However currently, amid of the ruin in Gaza, famine, dead and orphaned children and outrage regarding the refusal by numerous Jewish individuals who decline to acknowledge their complicity, that unity has broken down. The moderate Zionist position {has lost|no longer